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Abstract
Soon selling was legally and uniformly reintroduced in Australia in 1986. This
presented the opportunity to study the effects ofpermitting soon selling on stock market
trading. The following study aims to determine the impact ofsOOn selling on the bid ask
spread and thus transaction costs. The evidence presented in this paper supports the
notion that soon selling acts to reduce the size ofthe bid ask spread. The public policy
implication is that soon selling is desirable as it acts to reduce the size oftransactions
costs on the stock exchange.

1 Introduction
There have been many studies which have examined the effect of particular
characteristics of trading design on the bid ask spread. The bid ask spread represents a
major part of transactions costs for a round trip transaction on the stock exchange (the
other component is stamp duty and brokerage fees) and thus has become the focal point
for these studies which argue that spread or transaction cost minimisation is desirable
because it promotes a more perfect capital market [1117]. Table lover page provides a
description of these studies and their broad findings. The studies suggest various trading
design characteristics that promote low spreads and thus transaction costs. For example
the Santomero (1974) and Hamilton (1978) studies advocate the introduction of
automated quotation systems as they found that this leads to a decrease in the spreads of
stocks ceteris paribus. Similarly Cohen and Conroy (1990) advocate 'back office' type
matching as they found this lead to lower spreads on the main exchange, however,
Hamilton (1976) suggests that the implied spreads on 'back office' transactions is higher.
Tinic and West (1974) suggest that the use of a monopoly market maker leads to reduced
spreads, however, Hamilton (1978) in a more rigourous study that controlled for more
individual and general market forces that influenced spreads implied that there was no
significant difference between the spreads caused by monopoly market makers and
nonmonopoly market makers. Finally, both Branch and Freed (1977) and Hamilton
(1979) found that allowing trading on other exchanges with a monopoly market maker on
the main exchange tends to reduce spreads.
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Table 1 : Studies Examining the Effect on the Bid Ask Spread of Different
Institutional Designs
Author (5)

Year

Institutional

Sample

Details

Erred on Spread

Characteristic
Reilly and
Slaughter

March
1973

Santomero

Jan
1974

Tillie and West

June
1974

Hamilton

Dec
1976

Studied
Quotation of 30
NYSE Stocks on
NASDAQon5
April, 1971
Institution of
NASDAQ on 1 Feb
1971 forOTC
Stocks
Monopoly NYSE
Dea1a'Market
MakingVs
Tororuo Stock
Exc:hmge Agent
Market Making VS
Nomnonopoly
DeaIersbip Market
Making on OTC
Market
Monopoly
market making and
listing on NYSE Vs
Nomnonopoly
market making and
IrIding on the OTC

No or Stocks
30

56

177 TSE
TnNYSE

199NYSE
2090TC

Spread Data
NYSE 1 March to 7
J\D1e 1971
NASDAQ 28 April
to 7 J\D1e, 1971
1 July to 30 Dec
1971
1 April to 30 Sept
1971
TSE 1 to 13 Dec
1971
NYSE71Much
1969

30 April, 30 June
and 31 Aug 1970

no significant effect

fall in spreads

Monopoly market
making reduces
spreads

• NYSE spreads
smaller than OTC
(and impliedly back
office'trades)
- fall in NYSE

=

spreads fan in
OTCSJRAdsu
transactions

Hamilton

May
1978

Introduction of
NASDAQ OIl OTC
on 8 Feb, 1971

182NYSE
1740TC

Branch and Freed

Much
1977

NYSE

Hamilton

Much
1979

Tndin& of NYSE
stocks in third
market
IrIding of NYSE
stocks in the OTC
market

315

average for Dec
1974, Jm, Feb and
March 1975

Cohen and Conroy

April
1991

Rule 19c·3
incroduced 18 July,
1980: allows
broke1'l to let u
deale1'l

145

29 sample dales
from May 1981 to
November 1983
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30 April, 30 June.
31 Aug 1970 and
1971
24 Jm, 1974

increase
fall in spreads

reduces spreads

fall in spreads due
to competition is
greau::r than the rise
due to
fragmentation
fall in spreads

Shan selling was introduced in Australia in 1986, thereby permitting its impact on
spreads to be empirically and directly studied. The aim of this study was to determine
whether short selling is desirable in so far as it reduces spreads, and thus transaction
costs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the history of
shan selling in Australia leading up to its general introduction in 1986. Section 3
presents some theoretical discussion as to the likely impact of shan selling on spreads.
Sections 4 and 5 outline the methodology and data respectively used to determine the
impact of shan selling on spreads. Finally section 6 is reserved for a discussion of the
results, whilst section 7 contains the conclusion.

2 A Brief History of Short Selling in Australia
Shan selling occurs when a stock market participant sells stocks without actually owning
them at the time of sale. The Securities Industry Code (SIC) was the first form of
uniform companies legislation in Australia, which outright prohibited shan selling of
stocks under section 68 (1) [which became section 846(1) of the Corporations Law in
December 1990]. The effective date of commencement of the SIC in Australia was 1
July 1981 except in the Nonhero Territory, where commencement was 1 July 1986.
Exceptions to this prohibition of short selling were contained within section 68 (3)
[which became section 846 (3)] included:
• Shan selling by Brokers who specialised in odd lots, in odd lot
transactions,
• Shan selling in an arbitrage transaction involving a simultaneous sale
and purchase on two different exchanges,
• Shan selling by a seller who had entered into a contract to purchase the
relevant stocks which had not yet been delivered, and
• Shan selling by a seller who makes arrangements to deliver the stocks in
three days, provided the stock price is not falling.
Another exception to this prohibition was by Regulation 34 of the Securities Industry
Regulations [which became Regulation 7.4.08 in July 1990] which originally became
effective at the same time as the SIC. Regulation 34 permitted a shan sale of stocks
when they were covered by call options traded on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Prompted by a recommendation by the Australian Financial System Inquiry (the
Campbell Committee), A joint exposure draft was released on 29 April 1985 by the
Australian Associated Stock Exchanges (ASX) and the National Companies and
Securities Committee promulgating the general shan selling of stocks subject to certain
safeguards. The exposure draft eventually lead to the insertion of section 68(3)(e)
[which became section 846(3)(e)] which became effective in March 1986. Section 68(3)
(e) permitted shan selling of stocks provided that at the time of the sale:
(i) the stock was in a list of 'approved securities' in which shan selling
may be permitted,
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(ii) the sale was in accordance with the business rules of the ASX , and
(iii)the seller was not an associate of the company that issued the
securities.

A Business Rule detailing the operation of short selling was issued in April 1986 by the
AASX which was introduced together with s68(3)(e). The original Business Rule
subsequently became Business Rule 2.18 of the Australian Stock Exchange in 1987 when
the state stock exchanges combined and was amended in September, 1989. The original
rule, and the rule as it currently stands permitted short selling of 'approved securities'
provided a short sale is not to be made at a price lower than the last transaction
price[2.18 (8)].
Business Rule 2.18 (13) stipulates the criteria stocks must meet in order to be designated
'approved securities'. The most important of these are that a stocks:
(i) Market capitalisation of the shares on issue is greater than $100m, and
(ii) In the opinion of the home exchange there is sufficient liquidity in the
market for the security .

As at the date the original legislation became effective 57 ordinary stocks were 'approved
securities' for the purposes of the short selling provisions of the act and the Business
Rules. The list of 'approved securities' was contained within Business Rule 6.18 (1)
which also became operative in April 1986. The introduction of short selling provisions
meant that its impact on the stock market could be studied. In the following section the
likely impact of the introduction of short selling is discussed.

3 The Effect or Short SeIling on the Bid Ask Spread

In discussing a multidealer market setting Benston and Hagerman (1974), draw on the
market structure and dealer inventory holding cost arguments in the seminal article by
Demsetz (1968). Their analysis suggests that the greater the supply of immediacy to a
stock market (ie., the supply of immediate transactions for those submitting market
orders) the lower the spreads. Their argument implies that the number of dealers
submitting limit buy and sell orders would cause the price on such orders to move closer
together owing to competition. They explain 'A large number of dealers should keep the
spread down to the competitive level' [p355].
Such an argument implicitly assumes that dealers are free to submit competitive buy and
sell quotes without restriction at any point in time. However, in an environment where
short selling is prohibited, dealers are required to have an inventory of stocks prior to
submitting a sell quote. In such an environment, although a large number of dealers may
exist, some of them may be prevented from competing for the supply of stocks by
submitting sell quotes because they do not hold inventories of stocks. This lack of
competition on the supply side of the market could lead to a wider spread.
Alternately, if dealers were to keep stocks of inventories in order to be able to compete in
the supply side of the market. Then, they would incur higher holding costs which would
also result in wider spreads as compensation to cover the higher inventory holding costs
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Table 2 : Regression Studies of the Determinants of the Width of Spreads

Study

Exch.

Sample

Dependmt
Variable(.}

Dac:ripL

Dala

No of

lDdepcndent
Variable(.}

Stoeb

DemIea (1968)

NYSE

192

Average of2

• $ bid uk IpI'llad

trading day. in
.~

1965

·Price per Share +
·No of traDllday+

SIOCkPrice

·No of muteu OIl
wbicllliAed
·No of .1wdIo1den +

Tmic:
(1972)

NYSE

80

.$ bid uk Ipnad

Averqe19
CllDIeaIIiveday.

• Price per Share +
·No of Sbua Traded/day+

trading in 1969

-<:ompeblioa IDdes.+
·No of IDailmiCllla1
1Dwa.on+
• TnDIKliClllllday+
*TndiDg COIIliDaity+
·No of SIOCb badJed by
IpeCialiIl+
·SIOCk Price Volatility

.Pun:buiDa Caplcity of
Specia1i1l
Bamea

NnE

81

(1974)

Averap Month

•

·rrndiDl Volamelday+

md IpIUliI over

(Bid. AU)

21 IDClIIlbI from

(Bid + AIt)/2

Jm 1968
BenllOII&

OTC

314

HagenDIIII
(1974)

NYSE

76

• hIIider

baldina' ..+

·Dealer DummieI

Averqeof60

SSpreadlSbare

·BidPrice+

CXIIlIeaItiYe IDODIh

·No of Sbarebolden+

md qnadI from

·No of Dea1en+

Jm 1963
Bamea & Lope
(1975)

• SIDCt Price Volatility +

·U!l!Yltemstic: Ri.k+

Avaqeover 19

*SS~Price

u.diDa dayI in

·SVolame+

·RiIt

1969
Stoll
(1978)

OTC

2000

•

Averapof6

·SVol-Jday+
(Bjd- AM)

a.diD1 dayI ill

(Bid + AIt)/2

1973

·SVol-.rrnu+
*Share Price+
·No of Dea1en+

·DeaIer Wealtb +
*CampeIiliOll+
*Sya-ac: RiIk+
·Unsyltemalic: Rilk+
C1iang&
Venk·ree.b

NYSE

38

•

1 yeu of daily
dIla in 1973

(Bid + AIt)12

(1988)
• DelipalCl variablCl

·No of Sbaru tradedlday+

<Bid - A,k)

reponed U '.illlific:anl' in the relevant IlIldy

as a result of the compulsorily imposed inventory requirement.
S

·SIOCkPrice Volatility +
·"In.ider Holclinc.+

Thus regardless of whether traders hold inventories of stocks in order to deal, the
analysis above implies higher asking prices and thus wider spreads will exist in a market
where short selling is prohibited. The implication is that a market which permits shan
selling would result in lower bid ask spreads ceteris paribus. Thus the removal of short
selling restrictions on certain stocks in Australia in 1986 should have resulted in a
reduction in the spreads of those stocks ceteris paribus.

4 Methodology
In order to determine whether the removal of restrictions on shan selling reduced the size
of the spreads on stocks, it becomes necessary to control for those individual and market
factors which are contemporaneously and significantly associated with the size of the
spread. The factors studied in cross sectional regression studies of the spread are
presented in Table 2. The findings of these studies suggest the variables contained within
the following regression model are the most reliable and relevant given the nonmonopoly
dealer design of the Australian Stock Exchange:
S = a + a In P + a In V + a In (:J + a In INn + a In !NT
o

1

2

3

"
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where:
S =Average Spread
V = Average Trading Volume
P = Average Stock Price
(:J = the risk of a stock
!NT = Degree of Institutional Holdings %
INn = Degree of Insider Holdings %
In = the natural logarithm.
Unfortunately, a simple cross sectional regression using a dummy variable to capture the
ability/inability to shan sell a stock is inadequate. The correlation between trading
volume and such a variable resulting from the criteria used by the exchange to determine
whether shorr selling should be permitted for a stock, would introduce multicollinearity
problems in estimation which would reduce the efficiency of the estimation of the coefficients by increasing the standard error of the estimate [Gujarati, 1988, p.290].
Hamilton (1978) devised a time series methodology for analysing the introduction of a
trading design characteristic. The procedure involves estimating the equation above
using data from stocks after shan selling was introduced. Then data from the same
stocks prior to the introduction of the shan selling provisions could be used together with

--

the estimated equation in order to estimate the implied spreads (S ) of those stocks had
short selling been permitted at the time. These implied spreads could be compared with

-

the estimated spreads (S ) of those stocks using a regression estimated from pre short

-

selling data. The average of the differences between the two CD ) represents the average
change in the estimated spreads had short selling been permitted in the pre shan selling
period.
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However, pan of this difference may have been caused by other general market
developments which would have influenced the data used to estimate the post short
selling equation and thus the estimates of S **. Hamilton (1978) suggests that the effect
of other general market trends can be removed by using a control group of companies.
In this case the control group would be comprised of a sample of corporations on which
shan selling restrictions were not removed. The series of regressions and estimates for
the treatment group of companies can be replicated for the control group of companies to

,

yield (D ) representing the average change in spreads in the pre short selling period had
market conditions been as in the post shan selling period.
A test of the impact of short selling on the spread excluding the effects of any individual
and market influences reduces to a statistical test of the extent to which D * is
,
significantly different to D.

5 Data
Short selling was introduced on the 6th of April 1986. Data for the pre-shan selling
period to be collected is for the last week of trading which fell entirely in March, whilst
the post-short selling period analysed is the last week of trading which fell entirely in
May 1986. The periods selected allowed a gestation period for the short selling
provisions of almost 3 months, whilst maintaining a reasonably close proximity to the
pre- shan selling period to be analysed. In addition, the period chosen avoids the
seasonality in spreads associated with large stocks from September through to December
[Lamoureux and Sanger, 1989]. Spread data was collected from the Australian
Financial Review (AFR) for the periods Monday March 17 to Friday March 21 1986, and
Monday May 26 to Friday May 30,1986. The AFR reports the daily closing buy and sell
quotes which represent the highest bid and lowest ask price respectively. Thus the spread
representing the difference between the two is what has been termed the 'inside spread'
[Stoll??].
The average trading volume, trading continuity and average stock price for the two
periods for each stock was also calculated from daily data collected from the AFR.
The proxy for degree of institutional holdings was the percentage of ordinary shares held
by largest 20 shareholders, whilst the degree of insider holdings was proxied using the
percentage of shares held by the directors of a corporation. Data for each of these
variables was extracted from the Annual report of corporations. Finally, the risk
associated with a stock was calculated to be the standard deviation of the stock price over
the period in question.
When the short selling provisions were introduced in 1986, 57 stocks were designated
'approved securites' for the purposes of shan selling on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Of these, 12 had call options written on them which were being traded on the exchange.
Since the regulations existing prior to 1986 implied that such stocks could be short sold
provided traders held calls written on them, in order to avoid any potential confounding
effects, they were excluded from both treatment and control samples. This resulted in 45
possible companies in the treatment sample. A further 12 of these had to be discarded
for various data availability problems including non reponing of data in the AFR, non
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reporting of directors holdings information in the annual report, values of variables of 0
existed which prevented its logarithmic transformation, and non availability of annual
reports. The remaining sample of companies which will be referred to as the treatment
sample are listed in Appendix A.
The control sample was made up of a random sample of 30 stocks in the top 150 group
of companies by market capitalisation reported in the Business Review Weekly March 28,
1986. From this list, the corporations which were in the treatment sample and were
traded on the Australian options market were deleted.. This left 92 corporations as
potential matches. From this, 30 stocks were selected at random for the control group of
companies. This selection procedure was implemented in order to ensure that the
characteristics of the control sample were as close as possible to the treatment sample.
Those stocks in the control sample are also listed in Appendix A.

6 Results
Table 3 illustrates that the spreads of both samples of stocks increased from the pre short
selling period to the post short selling period. However, whilst the treatment samples
average dollar spread increased by about 25%, the control samples increased by 72%.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the introduction of short selling acts to reduce
the size of spreads, since the control samples spread represents the increase in spreads
which took place due to market conditions. Thus, the spreads of stocks which
commenced to be short sold did not increase by as much as the market dictated
suggesting the introduction of short selling acted to reduce spreads. The raw % spreads
are also consistent with the hypothesis.

Table 3: Raw Average Unadjusted Spreads before and After tbe Introduction or
Sbort Selling
Treatment sample
$ Spread
% Spread

Control Sample
% Spread

$ Spread

Pre short selling Period

Mean
Standard Deviation

0.056
(0.042)

0.016
(0.010)

0.092
(0.076)

0.021
0.009

0.070
(0.054)
25%

0.019
(0.014)
19%

0.158
(0.144)
72%

0.033
(0.015)
57%

Post Short Selling Period

Mean
Standard Deviation
Change from Pre to Post

In order to remove the effects of variables which have been found to influence spreads in
earlier studies, and which may be driving the results in Table 3, as per the methodology,
the spread regression model was estimated for each of the sample periods for both
treatment and control samples. Table 4 contains the results of the OLS regressions. The
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results of spread regressions using the percentage spread as an the dependant variable are
not presented as the results were poor vis-a-vis the dollar spread regressions and were
thus not used in the analysis. The results of the regression analysis are quite significant
with the independent variables chosen explaining between 49 to 78 percent of variation
in dollar spreads. The price, volume and insider holding variables were generally highly
significant and in directions consistent with most previous studies. The results for the
risk and institutional holdings variables on the other hand are generally poor. All models
were significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 4: The Estimated Parameters of the Spread Equation
Canst.
Treatment Sample
Preshon Selling Period
co-efficients
tlF value

0.149

InP

InV

0.048
6.003·

-0.021

adjR2

InIND

InINT

0.012 -0.003
1.77·· -1.3···

0.006
0.300

0.651
12.934·

-0.008
0.001
0.139 -1.96··

0.044
1.4···

0.489
7.125*

-0.306 -0.004
-4.366· -1.3··*

0.001
0.020

.786
22.361*

-0.026 -0.011
-0.840 -1.4···

-0.058
-0.693

0.540
7.817·

In CJ

4.928·
Post Shan Selling Period
~fficients

-0.139

tlFvalue

0.063
5.098·

-0.010
1.84··

Control Sample
Pre Shon Selling Period
co-efficients
t IF value

-0.549

0.527
5.428·

-0.006

-

1.5···
Post Shon Selling Period
co-efficients

tlFvalue

0.074

0.233
4.396·

-0.001
-0.159

• significance at the O.OOIleve1
•• significance at the O.OS level
••• significance at the 0.10 level

Table 5 presents the average spteads of stocks after adjusting for individual differences in
those stocks in the pre shan selling and post shan selling sample periods. S·· represents
the estimated adjusted spread of a pre shan selling stock in the treatment sample if short
selling had existed in the pre-shan selling period. S· is the regression estimate of the
treatment stocks spread in the pre short selling period. Thus D· [(S··-S·)/S*] represents
the change in spreads of the treattnent sample in the preshort selling period if short
selling had been permitted in the pre-shan selling period. The table indicates that
spreads would have increased by approximately 37%, however, a t test implies the
increase is insignificanL D· also includes the effects due to changes in general market
conditions, which is measured by D' [(S" - S') / S1. A t test indicates that D' is highly
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significant and implies that if the market conditions in the post shan selling period had
existed in the pre-shan selling period, spreads would have risen by 70%. Since this is
lower than D*, it can be concluded that if shan selling had existed in the preshort selling
period for the treatment sample of stocks, and the market conditions in the post short
selling period existed, then SPreads would have fallen by some 33% (D* - D'). This is
consistent with the original hypothesis. Further, a t test indicates that this difference is
significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 5 : The Estimated Adjusted Change in Bid Ask Spreads following the
Introduction of Short Selling

Mean
Standard Dev.

Mean
Standard Dev.

S**

S*

0*

0.065
(0.037)

0.056
(0.035)

0.368
(1.118)

S"

S·

0'

0.092
(0.068)

0.7()()+
(0.910)

0*-0'

0.332++
(0.262)

0.145
(0.108)

O'o*.[)'
+

significant at the 0.05 level
++ significant at the O.! 0 level

7 Conclusion
An analysis of the effects of shan selling on the bid ask SPread was carried out using data
from the Australian Stock Exchange which permitted the shan selling of certain listed
stocks in April 1986 which could not previously be shan sold. The analysis indicates
that permitting shan selling of a stock causes its bid ask spread to decrease and thus
transactions costs on the stock exchange for such stocks to decrease. The implication is
that shan selling is desirable, and that it should be permitted.
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APPENDIX A

Treatment Sample
Adelaide Steamship Company Limited
Ariadne Australia Limited
Amotts Limited
Ashton Mining Limited
Australian Foundation Investment Company Limited
Australian National Industries Limited
Bell Group Limited
Bell Resources Limited
Bora! Limited
Brambles Industries Limited
Bridge Oil Limited
Bundaberg Sugar Company Limited
Coles Myer Limited
Email Limited
FAI Insurances Limited
Humes Limited
ICI Australia Limited
Industrial Equities Limited
Kern Corporation Limited
Lend Lease Corporation
McPherson's Limited
Monier Limited
Moonie Oil Company Limited
News Corporation Limited
OPSM INdustries Limited
Pacific Dunlop Limited
Pancontinental Mining Limited
Peko- Wallsend Limited
Petersville Sleigh Limited
TNT Limited
Woodside Petroleum Limited
Woolworths Limited
Wormald International Limited

Control Sample
Advertiser Newspapers Limited
Australian Guarantee Corporation Limited
Ampol Exploration Limited
Australian Paper Manufacturers Limited
Borg-Warner (Australia) Limited
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BTR Nylex Limited
Burns, Philp & Company Limited
Commonwealth Industrial Gases Limited
Comalco Limited
Edwards Dunlop & Co Limited
Faulding (PH) & Co Limited
Hartogen Energy Limited
Herald & Weekly Times Limited
Keywest Investments Limited
Mayne Nickless Limited
National Consolidated Limited
Nonhero Star Holdings Limited
QBE Insurance Group Limited
Queensland Press Limited
Re~oC~amtionLimited

Rheem Australia Limited
Rothmans Holdings Limited
South Australian Brewing Holdings Limited
Sons of Gwalia Limited
Sunshine Australia Limited
Tooth & Company Limited
Tubemakers of Australia Limited
Universal Telecasters Limited
Unity Corporation Limited
Westfield Holdings Limited
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